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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the 
"Statement of the Case" as set forth in defendants LDS Church and 
Giblett's brief, with the following additional facts: 
1. From 7975 West (accident site), which is the 
driveway to the Haslam property where the cow crossed the road 
and Hornsby laid down his bike, to the corner of 8200 West and 
2820 South where plaintiff Hornsby made a right hand turn (R. 
812), the distance, as measured by John Sutton, is 375 feet (R. 
576, 578 and Exhibit 9). 
2. From 7975 West (accident site) to where Mary 
Sutton parked her vehicle, with its emergency light flashing (R. 
799, 782), just off the traveled portion of the eastbound lane of 
2820 South and where Mary Sutton was standing by her driverfs 
side door on the hardtop of the eastbound lane waving her arms 
attempting to warn Hornsby as he passed by her and her vehicle, 
the distance, as measured by John Sutton, is 210 feet (R. 578, 
579 and Exhibit G; 9) . 
3. From Mary Suttonfs parked vehicle on 2820 South to 
8200 West the distance is 165 feet (R. 792 and Exhibit 7, 9). As 
Hornsby drove the 165 feet on 2820 South in the eastbound lane 
from the intersection of 8200 West a) he passed Mary Sutton 
standing on the hardtop in the eastbound lane waving her arms in 
an attempt to warn Hornsby of potential danger ahead, and (b) he 
passed her parked vehicle with its emergency lights flashing. At 
the time he passed her, she said he was accelerating and 
exceeding the speed limit, which was 35 mph, (R. 799, 802, 806 
and 891). Hornsby said he was going 30 raph. when he laid his 
motorcycle down at the time of the accident (R. 926) 
4. As Hornsby drove the additional 210 feet on 2820 
South to the accident site at 7975 West he passed John Sutton who 
was standing on the hardtop in the eastbound lane with his back 
to eastbound traffic watching for the cow to come from the back 
of the Haslam property so that if it came out of the driveway at 
7975 West, he could attempt to direct the cow back to his fenced 
2 
property across 2820 South (R. 576 and Exhibit 5). His mere 
presence in the eastbound lane of 2820 South constituted a 
warning of potential danger ahead to an approaching motorist such 
as Hornsby. 
5. Hornsby testified that Mary Sutton's vehicle was 
10-15 feet from the corner of 8200 West and 2820 South, which is 
where he drew it in his deposition (Exhibit 38), that he turned 
his head to look at Mary Sutton and when he turned back, the cow 
was there in the middle of the road, 10-15 feet in front of Mary 
Sutton's vehicle (R. 93^-935). Hornsby believed he saw the cow 
two seconds after he passed Mary Sutton's vehicle and that the 
first time he saw the cow it was in the middle of the road (R. 
935). At that time, he testified in his deposition he was going 
15-20 mph. (but changed his testimony at trial to 30 mph.) (R. 
926) and that he could stop his vehicle in 10 feet when traveling 
15-20 mph. (R. 936). He testified he took his eyes off of the 
road to look at the girl (Mary Sutton) and when he looked back, 
the cow was in front of him (R. 937). 
6. Immediately after Hornsby had laid his motorcycle 
down and was sitting in the street, he was questioned as to 
whether or not he had seen Mary Sutton attempting to warn him and 
in response, according to Mary Sutton he stated: "If I had 
realized what that girl was trying to tell me this probably 
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wouldnft have happened." and according to John Sutton, he stated: 
f,I wished Ifd slowed up when that girl was waving at me or 
something, and I wouldn't be here now." (R. 586). Hornsby did 
not deny having made such a statement. 
7. Don Stewart, an expert in handling and loading 
livestock, testified that the manner in which the two cows were 
loaded, given the facilities available as viewed in Exhibits 1, 
2, 3 and 4, was in accordance with the customary and usual way of 
loading cattle in this community and was a reasonable and safe 
way to load (R. 875-876). He testified that hundreds of cattle a 
day are loaded the same way at the stockyards and that he has 
done it the same way at John Sutton's premises without ever 
having a problem (R. 876). 
8. Steve Williams, an expert in handling and loading 
livestock, testified that the manner in which the two 700 pound 
cows were loaded, given the facilities as viewed in Exhibits 1, 
2, 3 and 4, complied with the normal and usual practice in the 
Salt Lake County area (R. 905, 912). 
9. Garth Boswell, an expert who has either supervised 
or participated in the loading and unloading of 5,000 to 10,000 
head of cattle per year over the last 10 years (R. 501), 
testified that, assuming that two cows each weighing 700 pounds 
each loaded as was attempted in this case, as indicated in 
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Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4 and using bailing wire to secure the 
corral gate in the trailer with the hook secured in the loop, it 
was his opinion such practice of securing the trailer to the 
corral was a customary way of loading cattle in this community 
and that he had done it himself that way about 5,000 times (R. 
502-504). 
10. John Sutton testified that he had had four or five 
years experience in loading cows at his facility with trailers 
prior to the accident, that over that time he had loaded "a 
hundred or so" cows in the same way he was attempting to load on 
the day of the accident and that he had never had a cow escape 
utilizing such a loading process other than this one (R. 572). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the "Summary 
of Argument" as set forth in defendants LDS Church and Giblett's 
brief, with the following additional arguments. 
1. Whether or not the court properly conducted its 
voir dire examination regarding potential partiality due to the 
involvement of the LDS Church has no bearing upon the verdict of 
the jury in favor of defendants Sutton who were found not to be 
negligent in any manner and against plaintiff Hornsby, who was 
found 100% at fault. Prejudice or lack thereof regarding the LDS 
Church should have no bearing upon the verdict of the jury in 
favor of defendants Sutton. 
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2. Whether or not it was improper for defense counsel 
for the LDS Church and Giblett to refer to his client LDS Church 
as the "Welfare Farm," should have no bearing upon the jury 
verdict in favor of defendants Sutton. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR BY THE TRIAL 
COURT JUDGE IN THE COURT'S VOIR DIRE 
EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS REGARDING 
POTENTIAL PARTIALITY DUE TO INVOLVEMENT WITH 
THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING 
BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS (THIS POINT DOES NOT APPLY 
TO DEFENDANTS SUTTON) 
This point applies only to defendants LDS Church and 
Giblett and does not apply to defendants Sutton. Whether or not 
the jury may have been prejudiced in favor of defendants LDS 
Church and Giblett by the error alleged by plaintiff should have 
no effect upon the decision of the jury finding that defendant 
Suttons were not negligent. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ALLOWING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR THE LDS CHURCH AND 
GIBLETT TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS "THE 
WELFARE FARM" (THIS POINT DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS SUTTON) 
This point applies only to defendants LDS Church and 
Giblett and does not apply to defendants Sutton. Whether or not 
the jury may have been prejudiced in favor of defendants LDS 
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Church and Giblett by the error alleged by plaintiff should have 
no effect upon the decision of the jury finding that defendant 
Suttons were not negligent. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE AN 
INSTRUCTION ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the 
arguments made under Point III of defendants LDS Church and 
Giblett's brief with the following additional argument. 
A. The district court did not commit prejudicial 
error of law by refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa 
loquitur because plaintiff failed to meet his burden of 
establishing all three evidentiary prerequisites necessary to 
invoke the doctrine. 
In Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the three evidentiary 
prerequisites to application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur: 
The plaintiff must prove that: (1) the 
event causing the damage is of a type that 
ordinarily would not happen except for 
someone's negligence; (2) the damage must 
have been caused by an agency or 
instrumentality within the exclusive control 
of the defendant; and, (3) the plaintiff's 
own use of the agency or instrumentality was 
not primarily responsible for the injury. 
[Citations omitted.3 
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Ballow, 699 P.2d at 721. 
With respect to the first prerequisite, the court in 
Ballow specifically held that plaintiff, before he may 
rely upon res ipsa loquitur, must introduce evidence that the 
occurrence of the incident was more probably than not caused by 
negligence: 
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury 
instruction on res ipsa loquitur, the 
plaintiff must have presented evidence that 
the occurrence of the incident is "more 
probably than not caused by negligence." 
[Citation omitted.] The plaintiff need not 
eliminate all possible inferences of 
non-negligence, but the balance of 
probabilities must weigh in favor of 
negligence, or res ipsa loquitur does not 
a££l£. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has 
no application unless it can be shown 
from past experience that the 
occurrence causing the disability is 
more likely the result of negligence 
than some other cause. . . . In . . . 
Tomei v. Henning, 67 Cal.2d 319 
[62 Cal.Rptr. 9, 431 P.2d 633 (1967)], 
the Supreme Court of [California] had 
this to say: 
Since the res ipsa loquitur 
instruction permits the jury to 
infer negligence from the 
happening of the accident alone, 
there must be a basis either in 
common knowledge or expert 
testimony that when such an 
accident occurs, it is more 
probably than not the result of 
negligence. 
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Ballow, 699 P.2d at 722 (emphasis added). In short, 
lf[w]hen . . . the probabilities of a situation are outside the 
realm of common knowledge, expert evidence may be used to 
establish the necessary foundational probabilities." Id. 
(emphasis added) . 
In Ballow, plaintiff brought an action against 
defendant to recover damages for the loss of approximately 100 
acres of wheat and several rods of fencing owned by plaintiff 
which were destroyed by a fire apparently caused by defendant 
when swathing his adjoining field. The evidence at trial 
tended to establish that the risk of fire was inherent in 
normal swathing under the conditions which existed at the time 
of the accident. Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's refusal to give a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction: 
The plaintiff in this case failed to 
establish a foundation warranting res ipsa 
loquitur instructions. The evidence casts 
no light on whether the fire which burned 
plaintiff's property was probably caused by 
defendant's negligence. Plaintiff's 
testimony was that fires are virtually 
unavoidable when swathing and that fires 
"just happen," even when exercising 
reasonable care. On this testimony, the 
jury could, of course, have found that 
defendant had a duty to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent the spread of fire, 
but that raises no issue concerning res 
ipsa loquitur. 
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Id., at 723 (emphasis added). 
In Reed v. Molnar, 67 Ohio St.2d 76, 423 N.E.2d 
140 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court stated as follows: 
A division of authority exists on the 
question of the applicability of res ipsa 
loquitur to animal escape cases. Without 
passing on the first branch of the foregoing 
test, we find that it may not be said that 
the presence of unattended cattle on the 
public highway is an occurrence that would 
not have materialized absent someone's 
negligence. Thus, the doctrine is 
inapplicable and appellants were not 
prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to 
instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. 
In coming to this conclusion we are not 
unmindful of the legislative recognition 
implicit in R.C. 951.09 that animals 
may escape without fault or negligence of 
their owners. Similarly, there has been 
judicial recognition that cattle and other 
domestic animals can escape from perfectly 
adequate confines. [Citations omitted.] 
Reed, 423 N.E.2d at 145 (footnote omitted; emphasis 
added) . 
In Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Corporation, 681 P.2d 
1232 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court required the same 
three prerequisites for the application of the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur but expressed them a little differently as 
follows: 
(1) That the accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had due care been observed; 
(2) that the plaintiff's own use or 
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operation of the agency or instrumentality 
was not primarily responsible for the 
injury; and (3) that the agency or 
instrumentality causing the injury was under 
the exclusive management or control of the 
defendant. 
Based on the foregoing authority, plaintiff failed to 
meet the first prerequisite of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur because the 
accident (motorcyclist laying dowri 
motorcycle to avoid collision with cow 
darting into roadway) was of the kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, (would or 
could happen if due care is not observed.) 
There were three separate circumstances at three 
separate intervals which existed in the road ahead which would 
have alerted a motorcyclist exercising due care of a potential 
hazard or danger ahead, which Hornsby ignored or failed to 
observe and respond to in this case: 
1. At 375 feet from accident site. Hornsby could 
have observed a stopped vehicle with its emergency lights 
flashing just off the traveled portion of the eastbound lane 
about 165 feet ahead of him. If he had observed the same, he 
should have proceeded with caution. 
2. At 210 feet from accident site. Hornsby could 
have observed a woman standing in his lane next to the stopped 
vehicle waving her arms in an attempt to warn him of a 
potential hazard or danger ahead. 
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3. At 210 feet from accident site. Hornsby could 
have observed a man standing in his lane with his back to him. 
The mere presence of a man in such a position would have 
alerted a reasonably prudent motorcyclist to proceed with 
caution. 
If, as Hornsby testified, he was going 30 mph., which 
is 45 feet per second, it would have taken him almost 5 seconds 
to reach the accident site, clearly enough time to slow his 
vehicle, find out why two people were standing in his lane of 
travel and proceed slowly with caution. By his own testimony, 
he took his eyes off the road when he passed Mary Sutton and 
when he looked back, the cow was in the middle of the road. 
The cow did not appear out of nowhere. It had to come from the 
side of the road (Point A) in order to get to the middle of the 
road (Point B) . It would have taken some time to get from 
Point A to Point B. Hornsby, after disregarding the warning 
given by Mary Sutton, traveled a considerable distance without 
looking ahead. Obviously, if Hornsby was looking ahead and 
driving at a reasonable speed, he easily could have seen John 
Sutton standing in the road ahead with his back to him, he 
could have seen the cow approaching the road, slowed down, 
allowed the cow to proceed and avoid having to lay his 
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motorcycle down on the road. If Hornsby had exercised due 
care, there would have been no accident. 
Thus, the "event causing the damage" was the 
negligence of Hornsby, to whom the jury assessed 100$ of the 
fault. Since the "event causing the damage" was the negligence 
of Hornsby and because the accident was of the kind which 
happens when due care is not observed," the first prerequisite 
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not satisfied. 
With respect to the second prerequisite necessary to 
invoke res ipsa loquitur, the Utah Supreme Court held in 
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., supra, that 
defendant's exclusive control of the agency or instrumentality 
which caused plaintiff's injury must continue to and include 
the time of the accident. In Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. 
Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 49 Utah 82, 162 P. 83 (1916), 
plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover for 
damage to and destruction of certain personal property, 
including two railroad cars, allegedly caused by defendant's 
negligence. The evidence at trial demonstrated plaintiff had 
loaned two railroad cars to defendant for use in its business. 
Somehow the cars escaped from defendant's premises and rolled 
down plaintiff's railroad track, eventually colliding with and 
causing damage to other railroad cars. Plaintiff relied on the 
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doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court nonsuited 
plaintiff, and it appealed. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the nonsuit and held that plaintiff could not rely on 
res ipsa loquitur because it had failed to prove the cars "were 
under the immediate control and management of the defendant" at 
the time they escaped and eventually collided with plaintifffs 
other cars. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 162 P. at 85. 
In Zampos v. United States Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Co., 206 F.2d 171, 177 (10th Cir. 1953) (applying 
Utah law), the Court held that if the circumstances surrounding 
the accident in which plaintiff was injured, "are equally 
consistent with a cause which would not be attributable to 
negligence, the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] does not apply. 
[Citation omitted.]" In Trigg v. City and County of 
Denver, Docket No. 83-2397 (filed March 4, 1986, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit) (applying Colorado law), the 
Court reiterated that a plaintiff invoking res ipsa loquitur 
"must demonstrate the absence of equally probable alternative 
causes for [his] injury." Trigg, slip opinion p.6. In 
short, "[i]f there is any other cause apparent to which the 
injury may with equal fairness be attributed, the reason for a 
res ipsa loquitur inference fails, and the rule should not be 
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invoked." .Id., citing, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
328D, comment f (1965). 
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court are in accord 
with the foregoing. Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471, 474 (1956) (trial court 
correctly refused to instruct on res ipsa loquitur where "there 
was no reasonable basis shown in the evidence which would 
justify a conclusion that there was any greater likelihood" 
that accident was causally connected to instrumentality over 
which defendant had control); Jenson v. S. H. Kress & 
Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 P.2d 958, 960-961 (1935) (no basis in 
common knowledge or record to infer that broken glass shelf in 
defendant's merchantile establishment, which caused plaintiff's 
injuries, occurred more probably than not as a result of 
defendant's negligence.) 
Based upon the foregoing authority, there are two 
reasons why plaintiff failed to meet the second prerequisite. 
First, there is absolutely no proof in the record that 
defendants' control over the cow continued to the time of the 
accident. 
Second, plaintiff demonstrably failed to prove the 
absence of equally probable alternative causes for the accident 
such as plaintiff Hornsby's own negligence described herein. A 
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res ipsa loquitur instruction is improper unless plaintiff 
successfully demonstrates that the cause he proposes is more 
probably than not the effective causative agent. In this case, 
he completely failed to meet that burden. 
In Poole v. Gillison, 15 F.R.D. 194 (E.D.Ark. 
1953) the court held as follows: 
Now, a mule is not an inanimate object 
without any independent volition, but is a 
live animal possessed of a brain and an 
intelligence of its own; the mules in this 
case broke out of their enclosure in the 
night time of their own volition while 
[defendant] was in bed. Under such 
circumstances we do not think it can be said 
that they were under his exclusive control 
and management at the time that they broke 
out of the lot to the extent necessary to 
invoke the res ipsa doctrine. Moreover, 
even if it be assumed that they were under 
his exclusive control and management while 
they were in the lot, it does not follow 
that they were so subject at the time of the 
collision, and, under Arkansas law, it is 
ordinarily required to invoke said doctrine 
that the exclusive control of the defendant 
shall have continued up to the time of the 
plaintiff's injury. [Citation omitted. ] 
Poole, 15 F.R.D. at 199 (emphasis added). 
Because (1) there is no basis in common knowledge 
that the presence of a cow on a public highway is more probably 
than not the result of negligence, and (2) it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to prove defendant maintained exclusive control 
over the animal up to and including the time of the accident, 
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the majority of courts have refused, either on statutory or 
common law grounds, to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur 
in a case similar to this one. Annotation, Liability of 
Owner of Animal for Damage to Motor Vehicle or Injury to Person 
Riding Therein Resulting from Collision with Domestic Animal at 
Large in Street or Highway, 29 A.L.R.4th 431, 468-470 (1984) 
(citing 13 jurisdictions holding res ipsa loquitur inapplicable 
compared with 6 jurisdictions holding it applicable). 
The plaintiff's proffered instruction no. 24 on res 
ipsa loquitur, attached as addendum I to plaintiffs brief, 
specified "the bailing wire that came undone" as the 
instrumentality over which the defendants exercised "exclusive 
management and control" and not the cow. The instruction did 
not fairly and accurately state the law of the state of Utah. 
As clearly demonstrated above, however, the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur, even when appropriate under all the 
circumstances, does not create an inference of a causal 
connection between the inferred negligence and plaintiff's 
injury, nor does it absolve plaintiff of the burden of proving 
specific causation. Thus, plaintiff's instructions on res ipsa 
loquitur was inaccurate. It is axiomatic that the failure to 
give inaccurate res ipsa loquitur instructions is harmless 
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error. Ballow, 699 P.2d at 723; Brownlow v. Aman, 
740 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984). 
B. The trial court did not commit prejudicial error 
of law by refusing to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur 
because Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-38 (1953) as amended, as 
construed by the Utah Supreme Court, proscribes any inference 
of negligence based upon the mere presence of livestock on a 
public highway. 
By implication, if not expressly, § 41-6-38 
proscribes any inference of negligence arising from the mere 
presence of a cow on a public road. In other words, the burden 
remains on every "occupant of a motor vehicle" allegedly 
injured as a result of a collision with livestock, to plead and 
prove specific acts of negligence on the part of the owner. 
That was precisely the holding of this Court when it construed 
the statute in Hyrum Smith Estate Co. v. Peterson, 227 
F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1955) (applying Utah law). In Hyrum 
Smith, plaintiff brought an action against defendant to recover 
damages for personal injuries sustained when the motorcycle he 
was operating collided with a horse owned by defendant on a 
public highway. At trial, plaintiff relied both upon res ipsa 
loquitur and also on defendant's active negligence. The 
district court, interpreting § 41-6-38, refused to 
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instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. Notwithstanding, the 
jury returned its verdict in plaintiff's favor, and defendant 
appealed. On appeal, no error was assigned with respect to the 
district court's failure to give a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction, and this Court wisely declined to consider the 
issue further. 
Nevertheless, in its opinion in Hyrum Smith, the 
Court was required to interpret § 41-6-38 in order to 
adequately respond to defendant's claims of court error. After 
citing the statute, the Court made the following observations: 
So far as we are advised, this section has 
never been construed by the Supreme Court of 
Utah. We, however, feel that the language 
of the statute providing that where a 
collision occurs between a motor vehicle and 
livestock drifting upon the highway "there 
is no presumption that such collision was 
due to negligence on behalf of the owner or 
the person in possession of such livestock" 
is clear and unambiguous and should be given 
the meaning naturally flowing therefrom. To 
us the language means, and in considering 
this question it will be held, that under 
Utah law there is no presumption that 
appellant was guilty in permitting the 
horses to be upon the highway under the 
conditions they were found there, and that 
the burden rested upon the plaintiff to 
establish acts of negligence to entitle him 
to have his case submitted to the jury. 
Hyrum Smith, 227 F.2d at 444 (emphasis added). In short, 
the Court's specific focus on the statutory requirement of 
proof of "acts of negligence," forecloses plaintiff's 
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contention that § 41-6-38 permits him to rely on res ipsa 
loquitur. 
Section 41-6-38 was interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court for the first time in Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 
Utah 2d 375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). In that case, plaintiffs' 
motor vehicle struck one of defendant's horses on U.S. Highway 
6-50 in Spanish Fork Canyon, Utah. Plaintiffs sued defendant, 
but did not rely on res ipsa loquitur either in the trial court 
or on appeal. Plaintiffs successfully established that on the 
night of the accident, immediately prior to the collision, one 
of defendant's gates was left partially open. Defendant had 
been on his property during that day but testified he left the 
gate securely fastened. Rhiness, 472 P.2d at 429. Based 
upon the foregoing evidence, the trial court granted 
defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of 
plaintiffs' evidence. Plaintiffs appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. To properly dispose 
of plaintiffs' contentions on appeal, the court was required to 
interpret § 41-6-38. The court specifically held that 
section proscribed any inference of negligence from the mere 
fact defendant's horse escaped from his pasture and wandered 
onto the highway: 
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In order for the plaintiffs to recover in 
this action, they must show two things: 
First, that the highway was fenced on both 
sides; and second, that the horses got upon 
the highway through the negligence of the 
defendant. The mere fact that the animals 
escaped from the enclosure is not sufficient 
evidence, standing alone, to justify the 
submission of defendant's negligence to the 
Rhiness, 472 P. 2d at 429-430 (emphasis addecj). 
Based upon the foregoing, Judge Hanson correctly 
ruled that, under Utah law, plaintiff in this case was not 
entitled to a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
Defendants Sutton incorporate by reference the 
arguments made under Point IV of defendants LDS Church and 
Giblett's brief with the following additional argument. 
Section 41-6-16 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as 
amended) provides as follows: 
The provisions of this act shall be 
applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all political subdivisions and 
municipalities therein and no local 
authority shall enact or enforce any rule 
or regulation in conflict with the 
provisions of this act unless expressly 
authorized herein. Local authorities may, 
however, adopt regulations consistent with 
this act, and additional traffic 
regulations which are not in conflict 
therewith. 
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(Emphasis added.) 
Section 41-6-38 Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as 
amended which is entitled "Livestock on highway - Collision, 
action for damages," which is a part of the "act" referred to 
in 41-6-16, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
No person owning or controlling the 
possession of any livestock, shall 
willfully or negligently permit any such 
livestock to stray upon or remain 
unaccompanied by a person in charge or 
control thereof upon a public highway, both 
sides of which are adjoined by property 
which is separated from such highway by a 
fence . . . . No person shall drive any 
such livestock upon, over or across any 
public highway during the period from half 
an hour after sunset to half an hour before 
sunrise, without keeping a sufficient 
number of herders with warning lights on 
continual duty to open the road so as to 
permit the passage of vehicles. In any 
civil action brought by the owner, driver 
or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their 
personal representatives or assignees, or 
by the owner of the livestock for damages 
caused by collision with any domestic 
animal or animals on a highway, there is no 
presumption that such collision was due to 
negligence on behalf of the owner or the 
person in possession of such livestock. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 10-10-3 Salt Lake ICounty Ordinance 
entitled "Unattended Animals on Highway Prohibited" provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
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Every person . . . herding . . . or 
allowing to run at large, or causing to be 
herded . . . or allowed to run at large, 
any . . . cow . . . upon any of the public 
highways of the county shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
To the extent Section 10-10-3, the County 
Ordinance or rule or regulation, is "in conflict with the 
provisions of this act (41-6-38)," it, Section 10-10-3, is 
not enforceable. Since Section 41-6-38 covers civil actions 
involving "Livestock on Highway" (Section 10-10-3 covers 
criminal matters involving "animals on highway"), Section 
41-6-38, a legislative enactment and statute, preempts Section 
10-10-3, a county ordinance, rule or regulation. 
Thus, the Court properly refused to give plaintiff's 
proffered supplemental instructions on negligence per se, 
copies of which are attached as addendum 2, 3, 4 and 5 to 
plaintiff's brief. Such instructions were improper and not in 
accordance with Utah law. 
POINT V 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURTS' 
REFUSAL TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION ON STRICT 
LIABILITY 
Defendants Sutton incorporate by referenced the 
arguments made under Point V of defendant LDS Church and 
Giblett's brief with the following additional argument. 
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There is no evidence in the record that the cow in 
question had a "dangerous or vicious tendency11 as alleged by 
plaintiff. The mere fact that the cow somehow escaped from the 
LDS Church property to Suttonfs property and then remained 
there without incident or problem until John Sutton and Charles 
Giblett attempted to load it with one other cow so as to return 
the escaped cow to the LDS Church property certainly is 
insufficient to put John Sutton on notice that he is dealing 
with a cow with a "dangerous or vicious propensity" to injure 
or damage others. 
Thus, the court properly refused to give plaintifffs 
proffered instruction no. 25, a copy of which is attached as 
addendum 6 to plaintiff's brief. Such instruction would have 
been improper under the facts and evidence in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants Sutton submit that regardless of how the 
court rules with respect to the voir dire examination by the 
court and/or the alleged impropriety of counsel for the LDS 
Church in referring to his client as the "Welfare Farm," such 
ruling should not affect the Suttons and the jury verdict in 
their favor and against the plaintiff should be affirmed. 
Defendant Suttons also submit that the requested jury 
instructions on the issues of res ipsa loquitur, negligence per 
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se and strict liability were properly refused under the facts 
of this case. Plaintiff was given a fair trial under 
instructions permitting the jury to find any or all of the 
defendants negligent in their conduct in loading the cattle, 
attempting to contain the heifer after it escaped, and in the 
manner of giving warning to oncoming traffic. The jury decided 
that defendants were not negligent but that plaintiff was 
negligent in his approach to the accident scene. The judgment 
of the trial court based upon the special verdict should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 1986. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING 
Stephen G. Morgan fl 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Suttons 
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